

Oliver Stewart
RAIB Recommendation Handling Manager



8 August 2023

Mr Andy Lewis
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents

Dear Andy,

RAIB Report: Fatal accident at Moreton-on-Lugg near Hereford on 16 January 2010

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 4 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 28 February 2011.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendation and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendation 4 is **'Closed'**.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 9 August 2023.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 4

The intention of this recommendation is for Network Rail to understand the risk posed by the use of non-critical information systems in signal boxes and implement practical mitigation measures.

Network Rail should assess the risk associated with the use of TRUST, and similar information systems, by signallers when undertaking safety critical activities, and implement appropriate mitigation measures. This assessment should include a review of the extent to which signallers may be distracted or misled, and the influence of factors such as the location and orientation of any associated equipment.

ORR decision

1. In the closure statement, Network Rail identified three measures to address recommendation 4: develop guidelines to help inform decisions about the location of TRUST; training on the use of TRUST; training on coping with distraction and interruptions; and implementation of Auto-refresh on TRUST. We requested further evidence from Network Rail to demonstrate that these measures had been implemented. This took multiple attempts over several years, but we eventually identified and engaged with the Network Rail staff who could provide the evidence.

2. NR/L2/ER/4020 Engineering Assurance Requirements for Ergonomics within Design and Development Projects was provided to us in March 2023 as being the guidelines that would be used to inform decisions about the location of TRUST when it was being installed in new locations.

3. Training on the use of TRUST has been addressed in NR/L3/OPS/045/2.06 Competence Standard and Assessment Framework for Operating Signalling Equipment. The Workload Management competency addresses the use of information systems, such as TRUST, correctly. It is also addressed in NR/L3/OPS/045/2.17 Signalling Location Training Plans under the Information Systems Competency.

4. Training on coping with distraction and interruptions has also been addressed by NR/L3/OPS/045/2.06. The Workload Management and Attention Management competencies are part of the 3-year training cycle for signallers.

5. Network Rail has implemented auto-refresh on TRUST and provided us with a copy of the specification (CIP 2975 – TRUST Auto Refresh) used in March 2023.

6. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to close it

Status: Closed.

Previously reported to RAIB

7. On 6 December 2013 ORR reported the following:

Having considered the latest information from Network Rail, we felt that we did not have sufficient information to come to a decision on implementation. We wrote to Network Rail on 12 November requesting sight of the reports from the data collection phase and the risk assessment and confirmation that the actions above had been completed.

Update

8. Network Rail provided the following closure statement and supporting document on 6 June 2018:



9. Network Rail state the following:

Data collection and risk assessment carried out and mitigation measures identified as per attached presentation. Suitable amendment being made to Operations Manual to ensure procedure is carried out. This will appear in the standards change for September 2012.

10. Network Rail provided the following Signaller competence standard (a version for 2016 and the current document which show TRUST within the competence elements) on 26 March 2019:



11. In its closure statement, Network Rail identified three measures to address recommendation 4. We requested further evidence from Network Rail to demonstrate that these measures had been implemented.

- Develop guidelines to help inform decisions about the location of TRUST NR/L2/ER/4020 Engineering Assurance Requirements for Ergonomics within Design and Development Projects was provided to us in March 2023 as being the guidelines that would be used to inform decisions about the location of TRUST when it was being installed in new locations.



- Training on the use of TRUST This is addressed in NR/L3/OPS/045/2.06 Competence Standard and Assessment Framework for Operating Signalling Equipment. The Workload Management competency addresses the use of information systems, such as TRUST, correctly. It

is also addressed in NR/L3/OPS/045/2.17 Signalling Location Training Plans under the Information Systems Competency.



Moreton on Lugg
TRUST Risk Assessme

- Training on coping with distraction and interruptions

This is addressed in NR/L3/OPS/045/2.06 Competence Standard and Assessment Framework for Operating Signalling Equipment. The Workload Management and Attention Management competencies are part of the 3 year training cycle for signallers.

- Auto-refresh on TRUST

Network Rail has implemented auto-refresh on TRUST and provided us with a copy of the specification (CIP 2975 – TRUST Auto Refresh) used in March 2023.



CIP 2975 Proposal
v1.pdf

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 4

The intention of this recommendation is for Network Rail to understand the risk posed by the use of non-critical information systems in signal boxes and implement practical mitigation measures.

Network Rail should assess the risk associated with the use of TRUST, and similar information systems, by signallers when undertaking safety critical activities, and implement appropriate mitigation measures. This assessment should include a review of the extent to which signallers may be distracted or misled, and the influence of factors such as the location and orientation of any associated equipment.

Previously reported

1. In February 2012, we reported that Network Rail were addressing this recommendation in 3 distinct phases - data collection, risk assessment using the data collected and mitigation measures. The data collection and risk assessment phase was due to be completed by September 2011, with the mitigation measures arising from the risk assessment due to be completed by March 2012. At that time we reported that we were content with the Network Rail planned actions.

Update

2. We have since requested confirmation from Network Rail that it had completed its actions. On 9 July 2013, Network Rail provided further information on mitigation measures, these are below:

- *Data collection phase made 3 recommendations;*
 - *Develop guidelines to help inform decisions about the location of TRUST*
 - *Training in coping with distractions and interruptions*
 - *Training in how to use TRUST*
- *Recommendations from risk assessment;*
 - *Consider practicability of having auto refresh functionality*
 - *List of do's and don'ts for TRUST*

ORR decision

3. Having considered the latest information from Network Rail, we felt that we did not have sufficient information to come to a decision on implementation. We wrote to Network Rail on 12 November requesting sight of the reports from the data collection phase and the risk assessment and confirmation that the actions above had been completed. We expect to update RAIB by 31 March 2013.

Status: In progress- RAIB to be updated by 31 March 2014