

**Oliver Stewart**  
**Senior Executive, RAIB Relationship and**  
**Recommendation Handling**

Telephone 020 7282 3864

E-mail [oliver.stewart@orr.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:oliver.stewart@orr.gsi.gov.uk)

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Mr Andrew Hall  
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents  
Cullen House  
Berkshire Copse Rd  
Aldershot  
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

**RAIB Report: Extensive track damage between Ferryside and Llangennech, Carmarthenshire on 30 October 2017**

I write to report<sup>1</sup> on the consideration given and action taken in respect of the recommendation addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 16 October 2018.

The annex to this letter provides details of the action taken regarding the recommendation. The status of recommendation 1 is '**implemented**'.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 16 October 2019.

Yours sincerely,

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<sup>1</sup> In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Oliver Stewart

## Initial consideration by ORR

1. The recommendation was addressed to ORR when the report was published on 16 October 2018.
2. After considering the recommendations ORR passed recommendation 1 to DB Cargo, Puma Energy, Touax and VTG Rail asking them to consider and where appropriate act upon them and advise ORR of their conclusions.

## Recommendation 1

*The intent of this recommendation is to improve the working environment for safety critical wagon maintenance activities at Robeston.*

Touax Rail, in conjunction with DB Cargo Maintenance and Puma Energy, together with the owners of other wagons based at Milford Haven, should carry out a risk assessment of the facilities and processes that are used for maintenance of tank wagons operating out of Robeston terminal, taking account of the dangerous goods that are carried and the working environment at the site. A time-bound plan should be developed for any necessary improvements that are identified (paragraph 115).

This recommendation may also apply to other organisations which are responsible for the maintenance of wagons that carry dangerous goods, where such maintenance is carried out in outside environments.

## ORR decision

3. To assess facilities at the site and changes made in response to the RAIB recommendation, ORR carried out an inspection on 12 June 2019. The facilities, working environment and the way the work was undertaken met the required standards and no matters of evident concern were identified. We are therefore satisfied that the recommendation made by RAIB has been discharged by DBC and the other users of the Roberston facility.
4. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, DB Cargo, Puma Energy, Touax and VTG Rail have:
  - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
  - Has taken action to implement it.

**Status: Implemented.**

## Information in support of ORR decision

5. On 12 April 2019, Simon Cressey on behalf of DB Cargo, Puma Energy, Touax and VTG Rail provided the following initial response:

*In response to the ORR letter dated 13th February 2019 regarding RAIB report: Extensive track damage between Ferryside and Llangennech, please find below a*

*joint response to the recommendation from all wagon owners, ECMs and maintenance contractors operating at Robeston including the terminal owner. This response is risk based, evaluating the facilities and processes of tank wagons operating out of Robeston. The response has been written by DBC, all parties concerned have reviewed and commented accordingly, please refer to Appendix A for relevant names and contacts.*

*Post-incident, the following has been completed:*

- 1. DBC implemented a complete fleet check of all wagons fitted with TF25 bogies in accordance with Section 3 of DBS/EK/0370. From the check no issues were found.*
- 2. DBML completed a 'Tool Box Talk' on the correct methods of fitting brake components and locating devices these were completed on 8th November 2017 and 9th May 2018. The talks detail checking all components have been fitted correctly, asking a colleague to check, a brake test needs to be completed post renewal and refreshing knowledge of the contents of the maintenance specification.*

*Following the release of the RAIB report a review meeting was held between all parties on the 12<sup>th</sup> November 2018 (as stated in Appendix A) at Robeston to review the maintenance facilities, scope of maintenance work undertaken, facilities and documentation.*

*From the meeting the following have been agreed as post-incident actions:*

- 1. Tool box talk and retraining on the requirements for brake block changes.*
- 2. Supervisor to check brake block fitment (implemented by Touax).*
- 3. Briefing note to be issued to highlight the differences between the brake arrangements on tanks wagons maintained at the location.*
- 4. Determine the risk associated with changing brake blocks – confirmation of number of brake blocks changed out at the location.*
- 5. Fleet checks to confirm correct fitment of brake blocks, keys and split pins.*
- 6. Share independent audit reports with DBC (Touax & VTG).*

*Item 1 This was implemented as part of the post-incident response.*

*Item 2 This has been implemented as part of the post-incident response and as requested by Touax.*

*Item 3 The note is attached in the accompanying email.*

*Item 4 A review of the risk assessment associated with the maintenance work completed at Robeston has been completed.*

*A review of the maintenance work carried out at Robeston has shown that most of work is completed in the designated maintenance area which is controlled by the Safe System of Work and associated Risk Assessments as detailed in Appendix B.*

*These documents have been produced in accordance with the requirements of DBCs Safety Management System Section DBS/RHS/0014.*

*Inspections associated with inbound and outbound services are undertaken in accordance with DBS/EM/0030 'Examination of Freight Trains and Vehicles' which are completed by DBC Groundstaff. DBML Maintenance Supervisor completes vehicle specific maintenance requires such as 'Trip/Traffic Inspections'.*

*Issues associated with the loading of wagons and unscheduled maintenance work are carried out within the rail yard and loading facility at Robeston. Typical maintenance work carried out at the loading facility is resolving issues with manlids, this work is controlled by Safety Systems of Work and Risk Assessments controlled by Puma Energy.*

*Maintenance work carried out within the yard includes brake block renewal. This work requires the use of the DBML shunter to position wagons as required, supply air to condition the brakes following brake block renewal (requirement for integral braked TF25 bogies) and transport components and tools because the compressed air supply on site is a shore fed system; there is no mobile air compressor and motor vehicles are not permitted within the rail yard.*

*As part of the joint review, DBC has reviewed the number of brake blocks renewed during the period 3rd November 2017 and 30th November 2018. During this period a total of 2732-off brake blocks were renewed. These renewals were carried on a total of 271-off wagons which incorporates a total of 3-off CarKnds; 5-off different bogie types; 3-off different brake block arrangements and 4-off different key/fixing device arrangements.*

*From the data available and based on current maintenance practices, potentially 2524-off brake block were changed in the rail yard on 167-off TEA wagons which are fitted with 2-off different bogie types and 3-off different brake block/key/fixing arrangements. Based on the number of working days per year this equates to 1.5 wagons per week. From the review, the number of wagons perweek varies from zero up to 5-off.*

*A review of the risk assessments has shown that the task of brake block renewal in the rail yard is not adequately covered by the current risk assessments therefore an additional assessment (MH001) has been written which is attached in the accompanying email.*

*Item 5 This has been completed as part of the post-incident response.*

*Item 6 Three independent audits have been carried out at Robeston (Touax 29th June 2016, Network Rail NCB on behalf of VTG 17th October 2017 and DBC 6th November 2018). These audits have been reviewed:*

- 1. One minor non-conformity was raised by Touax regarding document control.*
- 2. No non-conformities or observations were raised by Network Rail.*

*3. Two minor non-conformities were raised by DBC regarding the original sign-off of risk assessments and document control.*

*4. Three observations were raised by DBC regarding ECM 3 communications, control of forklift truck driver competency and the condition of the staff accommodation block, gantry and stores.*

*All audit findings were either closed out during or immediately following the audits and were discussed at the review meeting which concluded that they would not have an impact or direct influence on the incident.*

*The review meeting concluded that the maintenance facilities and maintenance conducted on the wagon fleet at Robeston is adequate. The actions detailed above have been taken resulting from the incident, recommendation within the RAIB report, a letter sent to the PWF from RAIB detailing part of the Human Factors study and the joint review.*

*All parties as detailed in Appendix A take such incidents very seriously and will continue to incorporate the recommendations of incidents and high-risk defects into processes and procedures and will continue to monitor the maintenance of the vehicles.*

*All parties will continue to review and investigate safety related incidents and review and monitor hazard identification and logs in-line with monitoring processes detailed within SMSs and the ECM directive.*