

Oliver Stewart
Senior Executive, RAIB Relationship and
Recommendation Handling

Telephone 020 7282 3864

E-mail oliver.stewart@orr.gsi.gov.uk

21 August 2018



Mr Andrew Hall
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents
Cullen House
Berkshire Copse Rd
Aldershot
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

RAIB Report: Overspeed at Fletton Junction, Peterborough, 11 September 2015

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 4 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 1 August 2016.

The annex to this letter provides details of the action taken regarding the recommendation, the status of which is now '**Implemented**'. We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided becomes inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 22 August 2018.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Oliver Stewart', written over a horizontal line.

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 4

The intent of this recommendation is to identify, and ensure replacement of non-compliant operational signage. It may be possible to include this within an existing inspection activity.

Network Rail should develop and then implement a process to:

- check whether operational signs (eg signs associated with speed restrictions) are provided in accordance with relevant documentation (eg signalling plans); and
- record, and then correct, any non-compliances that are identified.

ORR decision

1. In response to the Fletton Junction incident, Network Rail issued a Special Instruction Notice (SIN) to identify locations where speed signs may be disregarded or misread by a driver. Locations have been identified for each route and arrangements made to replace signs as part of maintenance activities.

2. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken appropriate action to implement it

Status: *Implemented.*

Previously reported to RAIB

3. On 2 August 2017 ORR reported that we had not received a formal response from Network Rail to the recommendation.

Update

4. On 14 December 2017 Network Rail provided the following formal response to the recommendation:

Network Rail has in place current procedures for provision of permissible speed indicators as these are considered as lineside signalling assets under RIS-0737-CCS which has been adopted by Network Rail. However not all current assets were provided under these controls and legacy installations which pre-date these controls may be inconsistent with current requirements.

Network Rail proposes to address this recommendation by the controls issued under NR/SIN/161 which reviews permissible speed indicator assets against relevant documentation (sign sighting forms) and to address risks latent in the

infrastructure which is not considered tolerable. This introduces two phases of work

Phase 1

Network rail will create time bound plans to:

- *identify all reduced size speed signs not supported by signal sighting committee recommendation relating to physical constrained site*
- *to assess the risk of a driver disregarding or misreading a reduced size sign*

Phase 2

On the completion of the time bound plans, Network Rail will:

- *undertake identification and risk assessment tasks to the time bound plan*
- *replace reduced size signs with full size signs from the previous identification and risk assessment tasks under corrective maintenance procedures.*

These tasks are being initiated by the signalling discipline, as the provision of new permissible speed indicators is controlled through the signal sighting process; the provision and maintenance of permissible speed indicators requires interdisciplinary co-ordination between track and signalling disciplines to deliver the actions.

Timescale: 31 May 2018

5. Network Rail then sent in a closure statement on 25 July 2018 which states the following in summary:

Network Rail has undertaken two phases of SIN 161 which identifies and risk assesses the use of reduce size signage, and where applicable replacement of signs with full size by maintenance activities. The actions identified in SIN 161 have been completed by each route which mitigates the risks identified in the recommendation.

Previously reported to RAIB

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ORR decision

1. ORR addressed recommendations 3 and 4 to Network Rail on 5 September 2016, requesting a response by 4 November 2016. We are yet to receive a formal response to either recommendation. We requested an update on the progress of the response on 27 April, 1 June and 13 July 2017.

2. ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- has not provided a response setting out how it will be delivered.

Status: *Insufficient response.* ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.