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11 December 2017



Mr Andrew Hall  
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents  
Cullen House  
Berkshire Copse Rd  
Aldershot  
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

**RAIB Report: Unsafe events at Heathrow Tunnel Junction, 27-28 December 2014**

I write to provide an update<sup>1</sup> on the action taken in respect of recommendation 4 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 16 December 2015.

The annex to this letter provides details of the action taken regarding this recommendation, the status of which is now '**Implemented**'. We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided becomes inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 11 December 2017.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

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<sup>1</sup> In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

## Recommendation 4

*The intent of this recommendation is to consider possible solutions to the practical problems experienced by engineering supervisors when controlling access for numerous COSSs using multiple RT3199 forms. If practicable, an alternative method of control (possibly a matrix sign-in sheet operated within a robust process) should be introduced. The wording acknowledges that the engineering supervisor role will, in future, be undertaken by a safe work leader.*

Network Rail should review whether the use of multiple RT3199 forms should be replaced by an alternative, risk assessed, process for engineering supervisors/safe work leaders controlling worksites which comprise both multiple lines and activities undertaken by several workgroups. If justified by this review, Network Rail should introduce an appropriate alternative process (paragraph 132b).

### ORR decision

1. Network Rail has reviewed its procedures for assuring a safe system of work remains in place where work is being carried out on railways that are open to traffic, but are not separated by a permanent barrier. The outcome of the review indicated that Network Rail could provide better support to their managers and will update the guidance they provide to them.

2. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to implement it.

**Status: Implemented.**

### Previously reported to RAIB

3. On 4 August 2016 ORR reported that it was content with the Network Rail action plan and awaits completion by 31 January 2017.

### Update

3. Network Rail provided a closure statement on 1 February 2017 containing the following information:

*Network Rail facilitated a cross industry work group with COSS's and ES's. This review assessed REC 4, and the group discussed in detail possible alternatives of using multiple RT3199 forms. The discussions involved open dialogue regarding practical problems with ES duties when the role was*

*performed in a large construction site with large numbers of COSS's signing into a possession.*

*The outcome of the review from the workgroup was no alternative risk based process was necessary for controlling worksites with multiple lines and multiple workgroups.*

*The group looked closely at the intent of this REC and reviewed the wider aspects of the ES role and elements of the duties that could contribute to high workload and pressure resulting in poor levels of safety performance when the role is combined with multiple lines and worksites. This aspect of the workshop will continue to be examined and followed up to find solutions but are out of the scope of this REC 4; specifically, the possible development and functionality of the "signing-in App" for ES's will be reviewed in line with the 019 standard and the safe work pack.*