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Mr Andrew Hall
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents
Cullen House
Berkshire Copse Rd
Aldershot
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

RAIB Report: Incident at Llanbadarn Automatic Barrier Crossing (Locally Monitored), near Aberystwyth

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 1 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 27 June 2012.

The annex to this letter provides details of the action taken. The status of this recommendation remains as '**Implementation ongoing**'. ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address these recommendations.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 14 August 2015.

Yours sincerely,

Andrew Eyles

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 1

The intention of this recommendation is that high risk locally monitored automatic crossings in areas signalled by ERTMS [European Rail Traffic Management System] should be provided with an engineered safeguard to reduce the risk of train driver error.

Network Rail should develop an engineered safeguard to reduce the risk of trains being operated under ERTMS passing over locally monitored automatic crossings (i.e. AOCL [Automatic Open level, locally monitored] and ABCLs [Automatic barrier crossings, locally monitored]) when the crossings have not operated.

This solution should then be applied at Llanbadarn ABCL crossing and, if appropriate, at higher risk crossings on the Cambrian lines and as part of future ERTMS installations.

Assessments of risk should include an evaluation of human factors, previous history, including recorded incidents and accidents.

Brief Summary on what was previously reported to RAIB on 30 January 2014:

1. On 30 January 2014 ORR reported to RAIB that it was receiving regular updates from the Wales Route Asset Manager (S&T) which showed that implementation of the engineering solution was in progress. Final commissioning was planned for June 2014, although it was noted that this was reliant upon the equipment supplier, Ansaldo, delivering the Lineside Encoder Unit (LEU) in May 2014.
2. ORR provided a further update on 29 August 2014 which reported Network Rail's view that the engineering solution was more complex than originally understood. There had also been a delay in issuing the contract to Ansaldo for undertaking of the works required.

Update

3. On 23 June 2015 Network Rail confirmed that the proposed engineering solution, of fitting an LEU which allows a balise to impose a temporary speed restriction when the crossing is open to road traffic, had been commissioned at Llanbadarn ABCL on 21 June 2015.

ORR Decision

4. ORR considers that the commissioning of this engineering solution at Llanbadarn ABCL fulfils the requirement of the first part of this recommendation. ORR has written to Network Rail seeking confirmation of whether it considers that this solution should now be applied at other higher risk crossings on the Cambrian lines and as part of future ERTMS installations and, if so, when this work might be completed.

5. After reviewing all the information received from Network Rail, ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- is taking action to implement it.

Status: *Implementation on-going*. ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.