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11 January 2017



Mr Andrew Hall
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents
Cullen House
Berkshire Copse Rd
Aldershot
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

RAIB Report: Accident to a track worker near Redhill, 24 June 2014

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 3 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 15 June 2015.

The annex to this letter provides details of the action taken regarding this recommendation, the status of which is now '**Implemented**'. We do not propose to take any further action in respect of this recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided becomes inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 12 January 2017.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Oliver Stewart', written in a cursive style.

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 3

The intent of this recommendation is that there should be a defined and suitable method to address the risk that, after a train has passed a work site, the work group might return to the track while their lookout is still unsighted by that train, and that COSS/SWL and lookouts should be given appropriate training.

Network Rail should review the training of Controllers of Site Safety (or Safe Work Leaders) (COSS/SWL) and lookouts relating to setting up work under lookout protection. This review should cover the way which the lookout(s) and the COSS/SWL interact to confirm that it is safe for the work group to go on or near the line (particularly after a train has passed), and should include the definition of suitable methods by which lookouts may positively indicate to each other and to the COSS/SWL that the lookout(s) are unsighted and that work may not resume

ORR decision

1. Network Rail has taken appropriate action to formalise the procedures for a COSS/SWLs and lookouts to communicate when a work group is going on the line, particularly when returning after the passage of a train. Network Rail have also taken steps to formalise the actions lookouts must take if their line of sight becomes obstructed.
2. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - taken action to implement it.


Status: Implemented.

Previously reported to RAIB

3. By carrying out a review of the roles of the COSS/SWL and lookout in relation to leaving a position of safety to go on or near the line, ORR is satisfied Network Rail are taking appropriate action to address this risk. Action is due to be completed by 30 June 2016.

Update

4. On 25 July 2016 Network Rail provided the following closure statement and supporting evidence:



5. Network Rail state:

'A review has taken place of the COSS and Lookout training to understand whether they cover the way COSS and Lookouts interact to confirm it is safe for the work group to go on or near the line (particularly after the train has passed) and also to ensure they cover what suitable methods by which Lookouts may interact to each other and to the COSS/SWL that the Lookouts are unsighted.'

6. Network Rail also provided the key slides from the briefing material given to COSS/SWLs and lookouts:

Positioning & Briefing Lookouts Checklist

- *Emphasis there are no other hand signals permitted within the rules and any "extra" hand signals must not be used.*
- *Emphasis that when using Site/Intermediate/Distant lookouts; whenever the line of sight between any of them is interrupted a warning must be given as if a train were approaching.*
- *The group must then remain in the Position of Safety until it is decided by the COSS that it is safe for the work to resume.*

Before starting work

- *The COSS must check with the lookout when a train has passed to confirm that it is safe to return to work.*
- *The COSS remains responsible for allowing staff back onto the line.*
- *Before permitting work to restart after the passage of a train, the COSS must receive an assurance from a lookout that no train is approaching before he allows the group to return to the line.*

Testing and Passing on Warnings

- *If two lookouts lose sight of each other the closest lookout to the group must give a warning immediately.*
- *State that if the line of sight between two adjacent lookouts becomes obstructed, the lookout nearer the group must immediately give the warning.*

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 3

The intent of this recommendation is that there should be a defined and suitable method to address the risk that, after a train has passed a work site, the work group might return to the track while their lookout is still unsighted by that train, and that COSS/SWL and lookouts should be given appropriate training.

Network Rail should review the training of Controllers of Site Safety (or Safe Work Leaders) (COSS/SWL) and lookouts relating to setting up work under lookout protection. This review should cover the way which the lookout(s) and the COSS/SWL interact to confirm that it is safe for the work group to go on or near the line (particularly after a train has passed), and should include the definition of suitable methods by which lookouts may positively indicate to each other and to the COSS/SWL that the lookout(s) are unsighted and that work may not resume

ORR Decision

7. By carrying out a review of the roles of the COSS/SWL and lookout in relation to leaving a position of safety to go on or near the line, ORR is satisfied Network Rail are taking appropriate action to address this risk.
8. After reviewing all the information received from Network Rail, ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - is taking action to implement it by 30 June 2016.

Status: *Implementation on-going.* ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been completed.

Information in support of ORR decision

9. Network Rail wrote to ORR 17 December 2015 with the following information:

A documented review of the training for Controllers of Site Safety and lookouts will take place; specifically focussing on how the COSS/SWL interacts to confirm that it is safe for the work group to go on or near the line. This review will specifically include a review of the method used in this incident and how best to address the potential use of other unauthorised methods.

The review will take place as part of the Track Safety Training Review Group (TSTRG) during February 2016, which reviews and implements changes to the track safety training material. Any identified updates will be made to the training materials by June 2016.

The TSTRG meet biannually in line with rule book updates and is managed by Professional Development and Training and chaired by the Trackworker Safety Specialist.