

Oliver Stewart
Senior Executive, RAIB Relationship and
Recommendation Handling

Telephone 020 7282 3864

E-mail oliver.stewart@orr.gov.uk

12 June 2020



Mr Andrew Hall
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents
Cullen House
Berkshire Copse Rd
Aldershot
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

RAIB Report: Derailment of a freight train at Shrewsbury station on 7 July 2012

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 1 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 22 July 2013.

The annex to this letter provides details of the action taken regarding the recommendation. The status of recommendation 1 is '**Implemented**'.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 15 June 2020.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 1

The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to ensure that the risk-based approach to inspection of points to reduce the risk of derailment, as intended by TRK/053 and as mandated by TRK/001, is correctly implemented by all of its maintenance delivery units.

Network Rail should identify the maintenance delivery units which have not correctly adopted the risk-based approach to inspection of points intended by TRK/053 and mandated by TRK/001 [Inspection and Maintenance of Permanent Way: Management of Rail Defects]. It should then re-brief these maintenance delivery units on the requirement in TRK/001 and undertake follow up compliance monitoring activities to confirm that each maintenance delivery unit has adopted an appropriate regime, that all points have been the subject of a risk assessment and that all high-risk points are the subject of regular periodic TRK/053 [Inspection and Repair Procedures to Reduce the Risk of Derailment at Switches] detailed inspections.

ORR decision

1. Since the closure statement was sent to ORR (October 2018), Network Rail have continued to refine and improve the 053 standard. The 2019 version of the standard has further updated the standard in light of operational experience. During the update process ORR has reviewed the changes challenging and clarifying issues with Network Rail. We believe the standard which has been comprehensively briefed out to the routes, meets the requirements of the recommendation.
2. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - taken action to implement it.

Status: Implemented.

Previously reported to RAIB

3. On 22 July 2014 we reported that ORR was content that this recommendation will be addressed by actions being taken to address RAIB's Princes Street Gardens recommendation 1 due for completion by December 2014 (See annex B below for full response).

Update

4. On 22 October 2018 Network Rail provided the following closure statement:



2018 10 22
Shrewsbury Station

5. Network Rail state in summary the following:

The Maintenance Compliance & Assurance Team has undertaken a specific review at Delivery Unit (DU) level of both the understanding, and the application of the mandated requirement of TRK/001. The review has established that the DUs have a register of "at risk" sites. All Delivery Units utilise Ellipse as the main register with the application of specific standard jobs to reflect the level of inspection being undertaken on the asset.

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 1

The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to ensure that the risk-based approach to inspection of points to reduce the risk of derailment, as intended by TRK/053 and as mandated by TRK/001, is correctly implemented by all of its maintenance delivery units.

Network Rail should identify the maintenance delivery units which have not correctly adopted the risk-based approach to inspection of points intended by TRK/053 and mandated by TRK/001 [Inspection and Maintenance of Permanent Way: Management of Rail Defects]. It should then re-brief these maintenance delivery units on the requirement in TRK/001 and undertake follow up compliance monitoring activities to confirm that each maintenance delivery unit has adopted an appropriate regime, that all points have been the subject of a risk assessment and that all high-risk points are the subject of regular periodic TRK/053 [Inspection and Repair Procedures to Reduce the Risk of Derailment at Switches] detailed inspections.

Details of steps taken or being taken to implement the recommendation

1. Network Rail in its initial response on 7 October 2013 advised that:


The Maintenance Compliance & Assurance Team will undertake a specific review at Delivery Unit (DU) level of both the understanding, and the application of the mandated requirement of TRK/001. The DUs will also be requested to provide positive confirmation that they have a register of “at risk” sites. This review will be completed by 31 October 2013.

Following the review the actions to address identified deficiencies will be put into a time bound plan for delivery. Such actions will include the re-brief of TME [Track Maintenance Engineer] where a lack of understanding of the standard is identified and the production of a plan to risk assess each point end as required by standard where this has not taken place. Periodic monitoring of the completion of any necessary risk assessments will be undertaken.

The recommendation will be considered closed when each DU has a list of high-risk point ends, agreed with the Track RAM [Route Asset Manager].

Timescale: 1 March 2014

2. On 29 October 2013 ORR wrote to Network Rail requesting a brief summary of the review including conclusions and any further action it may be taking (including timescales). On 18 December 2013 Network Rail provided ORR with a copy of its National Review of Risk Based SO53 Inspections.



Network Rail concluded that:

- *Ellipse is the company register for assets, the review has identified that the Delivery Units do have a register of all sites and “At Risk” sites, albeit, some do*

maintain “other” registers over and above the requirements. No further actions required.

- *The competence review identified a few issues with profiles not being managed or updated; Delivery Units are now undertaking a data cleansing exercise to address the issues raised.*

Timescale – 31 March 2014

3. On 15 January 2014 Network Rail provided ORR with an update position stating that:

The review had been initiated on the basis that the switch at Shrewsbury did not have an enhanced inspection regime in place, and relied solely on the supervisor’s visual inspection. This had not triggered a full detailed inspection. The review investigated the approach that is taken nationwide and revealed that there are differences.

The requirements are currently specified in ‘TRK/001’ and ‘TRK/053’. ‘TRK/053’ describes the derailment hazards in section 6, and specifies (in section 9) the responsibilities of the person undertaking the supervisor’s inspection to assess the condition of the switch and trigger a detailed inspection when required. TRK/001/mod05 reinforces these requirements and the overarching TRK/001 standard gives more details about the principles of a risk based approach.

The position paper states that ‘the fundamental technical requirements are sound. It is the interpretation and implementation of those requirements that has to be clarified.

The workshops Network Rail has held with the routes confirm that there is inconsistency in understanding and approach. This has made our job more difficult, being particularly careful not to arrive in the same position again.

In summary our plans to change the situation are:

- *Briefing to RAMS to inform them of the current situation and remind them of the requirements of the current standard (Completed)*
- *Letter of instruction (LOI) to identify high, medium and low risk switches*
- *LOI to mandate DU’s maintain a register of high risk switches, and undertake a detailed inspection every 13 weeks*
- *DU’s to add medium risk switches to the register as appropriate through risk assessment and maintenance history*

These steps will provide better clarification and will mandate an enhanced inspection for the high risk switches.

ORR Decision

4. ORR is content that this recommendation will be addressed by actions being taken to address RAIB’s Princes Street Gardens recommendation 1 due for completion by December 2014.

5. After reviewing information received ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration and
- is taking action to implement it.

Status: *Implementation on-going. Due for completion by December 2014*